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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THESTA'I EOF I I IA II : 
Plaii ltil i/K espoi idei it, : • 
v. : 
FRANCISCO A. CANDEDO, : • 
Defci idai it /Petitioner. : ., •• *• v 
JURISDICTIONAL SFA T E M E N T 
y - m u a n 4. 2008, the 1 Jtah Court of Appeals issued State v. Candedo, 2008 11 f 
Arp 7! 1" :".-... -" ^memorandum csecisr. : \ * >:• -."• -: •• t 
A» .: ' -u 1 i; ; • isco Candedo\s Petition for Vvni of Certiorari to 
the Utah Court of Appeals on
 j \ :. ?.l)08. See Order daied Ji.!> ) 1. 2008 (attached at 
Addendum B). Jurisdiction is conferred ,-\> ;:.i., Court pursuai.; . \:u. . . . . > 
78. \, 3 102(5) ( fi id C( )de R ec< >dificati< )i I 2008) 
SI A I VE M E NT OF ISSUES AND S T A N D A R D S OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: "Whetl ICI the imposition of a nine-year prt>rh>,:, Mary ici,": \ :o;.:;,.: 
I1! I il n m e t N i I L ' J I I In i i l i u p i i, n ik*,> I U i i n d . i l n l l u l , 
Standard of Review: Fhis Court "'will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial 
court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the trial judge fails to consider 
. Male v. ui'uomib, 779 P.2d 1 133, 1135 (Utah 19&J) ^ mi^rial and end citations 
omitted); see State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, TJ59, — P.3d — (noting this Court will 
overturn "trial court's sentencing decision" if "'it exceeds statutory or constitutional 
limits'" (citation omitted)); State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^66, 52 P.3d 1210. 
To decide whether Candedo's sentence exceeds constitutional limits, this Court 
will consider the constitutionality of Utah's probation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 
(Supp. 2005).] Questions concerning the constitutionality of a statute are "reviewfed] for 
correctness." State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31,1110, 137 P.3d 726; see Jones v. Utah Bd. of 
Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,1|9, 94 P.3d 283 (holding statutory and constitutional 
interpretation "is a task we perform without deference to the trial court's determinations" 
(citation omitted)); State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4,1J8, 84 P.3d 1171. 
Issue 2: "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner's due process 
arguments could not be raised under rule 22(e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure." 
Order dated July 11,2008. 
Issue 3: "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding exceptional circumstances 
did not justify treatment of Petitioner's due process arguments on the merits." Order 
dated July 11,2008. 
Standard of Review for Issues 2 and 3: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the 
decision of the court of appeals and not that of the [trial] court." State v. Hansen, 2002 
Candedo was sentenced on September 12, 2005. Thus, unless otherwise 
specified, citations to section 77-18-1 refer to the 2005 version of the statute. See 
Addendum C. This Court should note, however, that no amendments to section 77-18-1 
since 2005 affect the substance of Candedo's argument on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-1 (Supp. 2008). 
2 
I I I I .'.\ 1|2:\ h < I', ul (^0 ii.|iiulaiion and \ ilalion mini led i Hi is < 'mul reviews "the 
decisioii of the court of appeals lor correctness." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STA 1 I ITS, \N1) RULIvN 
I he Inllnuini' m i|i kn itiiiulp 'I I In1 issues • At)ih iitlutn l1 
uniied States Constitution Amendment XIV Due Process; 
•
 :iah Consliiutimi \rli\Je [. Seclion "7 - Diic Process; 
. I.,:; ^ u iu ., , ,' I 'n ihali n-
77-27-i (2003) - Dcliilitioii of Probation. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS 2 
Cai idedo was charged will i. four conni-, •„>•; ^\,r.w . • • ,i -... . ucgnv :vi^vv5 
""'• ' • ' V--iv - vl.--- • . nc count of sales b> an unlicensed 
agent, a third degree felon), one count of employing an unlicensed agent, a third degree 
felony, and one count of pattern of unia^ iui a^iM'ity. a second degree felom -
Oi it f la;; ' 3 1., 2005 Cai idedo pleaded gi lilty t : • :.)i it: cc )i n it : f sect irities fraud, a 
second degree felony, one count of sales by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, a third 
degree felony, and one count of employing an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, a u,rd 
degree icimis. r '0,-ON, ' iL' , h1'• in 11 mi in iln Slaie ameni ' in «fi si ni ^ ^ in 
remaining charges against Mr. Candedo iii this case" and to "recommend orohaiion and if 
appropriate, a jan term " r " 1 " 'Ha: presentence report r ecommends ;;a; r a n c e c r 'he 
incarcerated n- ;;_ .s-:-,-. . . •• ,-
"
 rfhe underlying facts wl this case are not relevant to determining the issues ori 
certiorari review. 
3 
On September 12, 2005, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. R. 244; 270. 
The trial court did "not believe that Mr. Candedo had the same level of responsibility as 
[the co-defendant], although he has responsibility." R. 270:34. "What I think is the most 
fair thing to do with him is to have him serve some time, and then to work for a long time 
paying as much money back as humanly possible." R. 270:34. 
Based on this reasoning, the trial court sentenced Candedo to a term of one to 
fifteen years for the second degree felony, and two terms of zero to five years for each of 
the third degree felonies. R. 245; 270:34-35; see Addenda D, E. The trial court ordered 
the prison terms to run concurrently and ordered Candedo to pay restitution. R. 246; 
270:35. The trial court then suspended the prison terms, ordered Candedo to serve 365 
days in jail, and placed Candedo on supervised probation for "36 months on each count," 
resulting in a total probationary period of 108 months. R. 246; 270:35. Explaining, the 
trial court said, "That's nine years because of the amount of money that you've got to pay 
back." R. 270:35. Following imposition of the sentence, defense counsel asked, "Your 
Honor, may I just politely inquire, do you have a power to --?" R. 270:35. Interrupting, 
the trial court responded, "I can give 36 months on each of three felonies that he's 
convicted of." R. 270:35. Candedo filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 247-48. 
At the time of Candedo's sentencing hearing, the court of appeals' interpretation 
of the probation statute in State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, 110 P.3d 149, cert, 
denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005), and State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994), was settled law. Those cases held the 
probation statute imposes a 12- or 36-month limit on probation. See McDonald, 2005 UT 
4 
•IV '' ' ^ M O I I J M M K ^ ' • » . - " -
O n D c c c m be r 19, 2006, this Court issued State v. Wallace, 2006 IIT 86. 1 ?n P ?d 
540. Iii Wallace, this Court interpreted the probation stati ite to say ua court may 
1 en i lii ia.1 c probatioi i f c i a i eloi ly a.1 tl lii ly si: ;: i i 101 ill is, c i ill I i lay 1::::!, i i lii ia.l e probal ioi i lit any 
. • i^'ii "' Wallace, 2006 U T 86 at |^13 (citation omitted). "AJmilledN. when re.id n. 
this fashion, the pn*\ ision regarding 36 months is nearly meaningless/' id. iliu ;i, • 
C o u r 1 n ' t* .. ::iv a e * ^ . :.. . v. .; v J i a l h i M i \ i1 In nil u r . a i I HIL", • .. *.. 
'
s
 -•
 f
 ILL i iRib, Utah law "provides no statutor) limitation on the length 
of probation a trial court ma\ impose." Id. at f^ 14. 
0 r i
 annca v andedo argued that the probation :-.• .^ . :- w-^ . . .;. V\dju.a, 
"v - . : :uiu U.b. constitutions." Candedo, 2008 
UT App 4 at ^f l , 5. He asked the court of appeals to reach the issue "under rule 22(e) of 
:k- ! V:h Rules of Criminal Procedure, or, alternatively, 1aider the exceptional 
c1' • . v - * ! * cich tlle merits 
of his due process argument. Id. at ^]5-10. • 
"
w
 MMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mils C mill .liM"ld 1 WI.I ruaifa: I .unledn' nii"-v i! |M ohnl M »n.ir> pan >d 
violates due process. First, Utah's probation statute is not rational!} related u- ihe 
legislate eh-staled purpose of probation. ' ] Tlah, the purpose of probation is 
rcna. i*n«ion i ,v: a- : . • • • - . . 
Wallace ^ >w e\* - *: -^hauoii aialule is not rationally related to achieving 
5 
rehabilitation because it authorizes a trial court to impose a probationary period of any 
length, or to impose probation without specifying any termination date at all. 
Rehabilitation, if it is achieved at all, will be achieved within a relatively short 
period of time. Research shows that the rehabilitative purposes of probation are 
accomplished within five years. If probation lasts beyond this time, it undermines 
rehabilitation by driving the probationer to revert to his old lifestyle, needlessly adding to 
the overcrowding of prisons and jails, and diluting AP&P's already meager resources. 
In this case, the trial court imposed 108 months of probation. This probationary 
period is three times as long as the 36-month probationary limit apparently contemplated 
by the Utah Legislature, and far longer than necessary to determine whether Candedo can 
be successfully rehabilitated. As such, it violates due process because it is 
counterproductive to the State's legitimate governmental interest in rehabilitation. 
Second, the probation statute implicates a fundamental liberty interest and is not 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Probation is generally reserved for 
young or unhardened offenders who are likely to be rehabilitated. It achieves 
rehabilitation by limiting an offender's freedom, compelling him to comply with specific 
standards of conduct, reducing his constitutional rights, and threatening him with 
incarceration. If a defendant is selected as a person likely to be rehabilitated and is 
placed on probation, then he has a fundamental interest in shedding probation's 
requirements and regaining his liberty once the purposes of probation are achieved. 
Lengthy probationary periods are not narrowly tailored to serve the legislatively-
stated purpose of probation. In particular, Candedo's nine-year probationary period is 
6 
Inui wi t s Inn^ei lliMii llif" li\i' \i"n limit period idrnlil'inl hs research as beneficial to 
rehabilitation. '"1. hus, this Court should reverse bceause Candedo's nine-year probatioi lary 
period I> i- •• ::a.r:' "--^v 'nilorcd to serve a compelling state interest. 
i in. i n\\\-\ MMjii i 11 ,R li ( 'iindcdi» ' dm piucess ai'Miinciii iinilei ni]c°°(e). When 
a defendant is challenging his sentence, this Court has said rule 22(e) is sweeping and is 
broad enough to ei icompass constitutional violations, including due process violations. 
n n appeal, Candalo UitilleiiL'r. Ilie I u\ . '.mien iMid« > '« -1• i pnnrs1. < 1,'iiise. 
is ('our: -Mould use rule 22(e) to reach the merits of Candedo's argument. 
fhis Court shoi ild also reach the argument inider the exceptional circumstances 
doctrine. Rxcepiiv».ia. ciicum^Lances exi-.. ,xe^.u.>e ,- ' • ;. : - • c . • 
• •: statute as imposing a 36-month limit on probation. 
Phis Court did not issue Wallace until lakr Accordingly, at the time he was sentenced, 
Candedo had no warning that he needed to armie llu , i\.. .UK ,;
 l-\. . . ;; , 
process because, as interpreted by Utah law, it did not. Thus, this Court should invoke 
the exceptional circumstances doctrine to reach Candedo's due process argument. 
ARGUMENT 
1 1HS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE 
IMPOSITION OF A NINE-YEAR PROBATIONARY PERIOD 
VIOLATED CANDEDO'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
"No Stale •,. .. 
process of law." U.S. Const, amend. X\\ . $ i, el. 2, see Utah Const, an. 1, § 7 , 'No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.") Under 
7 
the due process clause, if a statute implicates "fundamental rights," then it is subject ato a 
'heightened degree of scrutiny.'" Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2005 UT 30, [^28, 
116 P.3d 295 (citation omitted); see Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, 1J30, 103 P.3d 135. 
This heightened degree of scrutiny says the State may not infringe on a fundamental 
liberty interest '"unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.'" Washington v. Glueksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citation omitted). 
Alternatively, if a statute "does not infringe upon a fundamental right," then it is 
subject "to rational basis review." Tindley, 2005 UT 30 at ffi[28-29; see Judd, 2004 UT 
91 at *p0. Rational basis review requires a statute to "rationally further a legitimate 
governmental interest." State v. Martinez, 2000 UT App 320, ^24, 14 P.3d 114 (citation 
omitted); see Tindley, 2005 UT 30 at {^27. A statute does not satisfy the rational-basis 
test if it "has no rational relationship to a legislatively stated purpose or, if not stated, to 
any reasonably conceivable legislative purpose." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 
1993) (citations omitted). "[T]he presumption requires a court to presume that the 
classification was intended to further the legislative purpose." Id (citations omitted). 
In this case, this Court should reverse Candedo's nine-year probationary period 
because it is not rationally related to the legislatively-stated purpose of probation in Utah. 
Additionally, Candedo's nine-year probationary period likely implicates a fundamental 
right. Thus, this Court should apply a heightened degree of scrutiny. Under this 
heightened degree of scrutiny, this Court should reverse because the nine-year 
probationary period is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
8 
A. < "andedo"'s 1NIIIU-\ ear Probationary Period h N111 Ualionalh Kclalcd to nln 
Legislatively-Stated Purpose of Utah's Prohalion Statute. 
I ;"i 01 i i its ii icepi ioi i
 h t! i.e "core of tl le probation movement in America" has been 
"rehabilitation of offenders." Sharon M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, v . • -
( '' ' ^^ Roberts v. United States, * M ~*~^  MH * ' "oldim. *hai ' b a ^ 
^urnose of probation" is "to provide an individualized program offering a young or 
unhardened offender an opportunity to reii I.:.MM;.- ;>• ..- i. United States v. Murray, 
• '•' ' • ' • • ! - . • ' •-•• : a k c n 
one wrong step, anu whom the judge thinks to be a branu V\'IM c.m he plucked from the 
'MiHiiiiij ai me lime of the imposition of the sentence."); Sandra i.. Moser, Anti-
Prostitution Zones: Justifications for Aouiiuoii. 
("*()() 1) ("Probation is a manifestation of the pena; plulosoph) of rehabilitation."";. 
Ilikewise. \hx lei:.i*-!a!i\el\-stated purpose of probation in I Itah is rehabilitation. 
See I-lull L ode . iM.. s - . > .-u.iui^ ;»;"o»x. <: l 
"act :)'f grace b)< 1,1 i : eon n I si ispci iding tl :ie imposition or execution of a convicted 
offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions." Id.; see State v. Spiers, 361 P.2d 509, 
51 1 n T l , i '; • • . id:i;L. uii.i reiitmi.ii.mo:; o; -he persoi i oi i pi ot: >atioi I is 1 1 le l i lost 
; hainc v. Beckstead, 347 P.2d 554, 557, 559 (Utah 1959) (holding 
tllat the "fundamental objce!i\ e of prohatioif is 'Tcfon-. and rehabilitation"); State v. 
Bonza, 150 P.2d 970. ^ 2 * l :.-.i-
 f'.'--; > r.io.dmg "purpose oi u.e proi\mon siaiute ' is to 
pi o v ide opporti it lity f •'•, • " * • - • ' * Male \ . Parker. S"^ i( 'd K> H, 
9 
1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("The purposes of probation are 'reform and rehabilitation' 
rather than punishment." (citations omitted)). 
Rehabilitation is a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). It 
improves probationers' lives and prospects; allows families to stay together; allows a 
probationer to work to repay his debt to society; saves tax dollars; relieves congestion in 
the jails and prisons; and makes society safer by catching offenders while they are young 
or unhardencd and reversing their downward spiral before it is too late. 
Utah's probation statute, however, is not rationally related to achieving this 
interest. As interpreted by Wallace, the probation statute authorizes a trial court to 
impose a probationary term of any length, or to impose probation without specifying any 
end date at all. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i); Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^13. 
But lengthy and/or endless probationary terms do not rationally further rehabilitation. 
Rehabilitation, if it is achieved at all, will be achieved "within a relatively short 
period of time." National Comm'n on Reform of Fed. Grim. Laws, Final Report, § 3105 
comment at 282 (1971); United States v. Albano, 698 F.2d 144, 149 (2nd Cir. 1983) ("[I]l 
is frequently thought that the rehabilitative purpose of probation can be accomplished, if 
at all, within five years." (citations omitted)); State v. Oliver, 490 A.2d 242, 248 (Md. 
1985) ("The experts in this area have generally argued that the rehabilitative purpose of 
probation can be achieved, if at all, within five years.'" (citations omitted)); U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, 2 Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures, 313 (1939) ("[PJroper 
10 
seleclioi i of pi obatioi i si ibjects presi ippose|s] 1 1 mt i efon nation • :>t i el l ab i l i l atioi i may be 
achieved within a relatively short period, generally 2 years."). 
Thus, probation should only last as long as necessary "'to deternnm \\iic;:.er 
con I uience has been nu.-placed and lo i"fu Hie supen r o n iv inn jtlequ lie nppmiiini!' 
" active.'" American Bar Ass'n Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 2.3(b)(ii) (approved 
w;..i:. J -.^
 tiL o i X - .»mi.ieni.t:; . •• '••*' ' ':•..-' • -... Manda*u. 
iwiaiing to sentencing Aucrnau\ t^ ami Procedures): see ! ; ruled States v. Lancer, 508 
i;.2d 719, 739 (3rd ( ir N " ; u iunicr. I . disseniing) (concluding that 'Mlxe }'cars of 
probation is adequate to determine wlivi.-.c. u^,ai iu . . . i ^ -icu-iiu sul'licu'iills adjusted 
'o soeici\"" and imposing a longer term 
of probation ""does not seem compatible w nn a polio, of affording the 'unfortunate 
another opportunity by clemency'"" (quoting Korematsu v. United States, ^ i v i > 
• • • ' - ) ; Mate v. Angle, 3^ ;' N V\ ."M-I M. ^ ( l o w a i W l ) I "We hi \W\\ (statute 
limiting probation to five years] reflects the attitude of correctional authorities that 
rehabilitation will occi ir within five years or not at all." (citing J. Yeager & R, Carlson, 
Criminal Law and Procedun "v "'» i ,- \uon ie> 
General's Survey of Release Procedures 315 (1939) (noting that "ftjhere is no 
justification for continuing probationary oversight beyond 5 years"). 
11 probai:**,, ;w .;, ,;~;. ^  . . . ."•. 
aes the rehabilitative uoals n r probation, adds to the 
overcrowding of prisons and jails, and dilnies AP&P's already meager resources. 
11 
First, long probationary periods undermine the rehabilitative goals of probation by 
reinforcing the probationer's belief that he is an outsider whom society distrusts and is 
determined to see fail. Cf. ABA, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and 
Procedures, § 2.3(b)(ii) at 64 & Commentary at 70 (noting open-ended probation 
"impcde[s| rehabilitation by failing to provide the offender with a terminal point towards 
which he can work"). As explained by this Court: 
Probation programs are postulated upon an awareness that one 
who has been convicted of a crime in all likelihood had some social 
maladjustment and often a feeling that he is picked on or abused by 
society. Essential to the correction of these things and the bringing 
about of a well-disposed attitude toward society and its laws is the 
allaying of any existing feelings of inferiority or resentment. These 
considerations make it particularly important that his situation of 
limited liberty not be used as a basis to take advantage of or impose 
upon him. They rather argue the advisability of being careful, not 
only to treat him fairly, but in such a manner that he will see the 
fairness of it. 
Bame, 347 P.2d at 559. 
Probation severely limits a person's freedom, encroaches on his constitutional 
rights, and constantly threatens him with incarceration. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-1; Samson V.California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) ("probationers 'do not enjoy "the 
absolute liberty"' of other citizens (citations omitted)); United States v. Nachtigal, 507 
U.S. 1, 5 (1993) (per curiam) ("liberty infringement [is] caused by a term of probation"); 
Blanton v. City of North Las Veaas, Nev., 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) ("probation . . . may 
engender 'a significant infringement of personal freedom'" (citation omitted)); State ex 
rcl. A.C.C., 2002 UT 22, ^24, 44 P.3d 708 ("c[I]nherent in the very nature of probation is 
that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled/" 
12 
( :ita1 io! i on lil ted)); Smith v. Cook, 8u.^  »' ".J /88, 7v • .an i ^ Q ) ("' Hie general nature 
of probation places significant restrictions on tlic liberty of the person placed on 
probation" (citation omitted)); State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 48 ; , ^ 189 (I Jtal :i 1981) 
11 ii i ilitilioiit i •! h;i\ t | ii i nil {| pt i n i. din ,i I 11" In I - !im I ; r n si 11"11. 11 .' •' personal 
liberty"); R. 246. 
Extending probation beyond the time that its burdensome requirements and 
limitation^ .;.><. necessary to compel O'iripli.iri e in "Ihu '.VMMI1, "snbjri (|in(e| llie 
offender to a pointlessly extended jeopardy," Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal 
Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862 (2007) (citation omitted) (hereinafter LaFave, Criminal 
Procedure)—threatens In w ..-.., i ^ . 
defenr ••••• • << , LO iuci nke an outsider even when he ib living by society's rules. See 
Baine, 347 P.2d at 559. If a defendant cannot "see the fairness" in his probationary 
period, then l.«s . ..^  im*^ of inferiority or resentment" mav rei, • , . • ; 
newly act •>-. J» -^  . • • • .ind il\ laws" and driving hii n to return lo his 
previous lifestyle. Id. 
Second, long probationary periods add to the overcrowding of prisons ai id jails, 
As explained
 k)bu\ e. piobalioin iMirii", m;m\ luinlensnnn in|iiireinents. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(8); R. 246. Regardless of rehabilitation, the longer a defendant is on 
probation, the more likely it is that he will violate a probationary requirement, Even if a 
d c f c n d a i 11 i s f: i 111 y i c : 1 i a 1: >i 1 i 1 a I c d 1 i e c o i 11 d s 1 111 ^ *>/ i it i d i i j: i i i
 < j a i 1 :.) I p r i s o i i 1 o i i i i a d v e i t e i 111 y 
violating a term of his probation. This would undermine the defendant's rehabilitation by 
making him feel he was treated unfairly, heaping upon him the stigma of incarceration, 
13 
and forcing him to associate with hardened criminals even though he lived in society 
crime-free for several years. See Roberts, 320 U.S. at 272 (holding "purpose of 
probation" is to offer "a young or unhardened offender an opportunity to rehabilitate 
himself without institutional confinement. . ."); Baine, 347 P.2d at 559. Or, as explained 
above, simple exhaustion from complying with probation's many burdensome 
requirements for an unnecessary length of time could revive old "feelings of inferiority or 
resentment," overwhelming his newly acquired respect for "society and its laws" and 
driving him to return to his previous lifestyle. Baine, 347 P.2d at 559. 
Third, long probationary periods aggravate AP&P's "caseload burden[s]" and 
dilute its resources by increasing the length of time it must supervise each probationer. 
LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862 (noting that statutes that do not limit the 
length of probation may "'aggravate^ the caseload burden of the probation staff" 
(quoting 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 18-2.3 commentary at 18-81 (2d ed. 
1980)); see Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 Crime & Just. 149, 157 
(1997) ("In recent years, probation agencies have struggled—with continued meager 
resources—to upgrade services and supervision.") (hereinafter Petersilia, Probation in the 
United States). This too will harm rehabilitation. In a probation program, "[sjufficient 
monetary resources are essential to obtaining and sustaining judicial support and 
achieving program success." Id at 186-87 ("'Unenforced sanctions jeopardize any 
sentence, undermining its credibility and potential to address serious sentencing concerns 
. . . they are like sentences to prison with cell doors that do not lock and perimeter gates 
that slip open/" (citation omitted)). 
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I n f a c t , in I"1'}'.-!, n lm/n L e g i s l a ; '• -0 ' • ' •'••"• * • ' * o 
limit probation, it identified AP&P's overburdened caseload as a purpose of the 
amendment. See S.B. 91, Day 20, Budget Sess. (Utah Jan. 28, 1984) (Rep. Nolan E. 
Karras speaking). "'"I} V"|e have not bcci I able I o pro1 'idc, (c i ; d iat :ver reasoi i, < M: IOI igh 
resources to | A PA1,1: |J" | u> be able to handle the case loads that they carry. Presently, the 
Utah's case load is 50% highci \rA]l (he n-fional average. These bills, Senate Bill 91 and 
Senate Bill S1)." restrict the ;.;;-: mai • ;Tenders are "i indn Mi|n;r\ ismn. ' Id 
Recognizing tl lat loi ig probal ioi lary periods undermine rehabilitation, the federal 
government and most states have enacted statutes that "set a uniform maximum such as 
five years for felonies and one or two year* {V' s usdemeanors." I,al*avv. Criminal 
Procedure, § 26.9(a) af H(P (< ilalnn . " • erpi etii ig these statutes, a few 
J
 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (ex h v 1996) (authorizing probation of no "more than 
five years" for felonies); Ala. Code § 15-22-54(a) (2008) (same); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 
12.55.090(c) (2008) (prohibiting probation for felonies from exceeding "10 years"); Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(a) (2006) (authorizing probation up to seven years depending 
on crime); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-29(d), (e), (g) (West 2008) (ordering probation 
for felonies to be "not more than five years" and requiring trial court to review after two 
years); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4333(b)(l)-(3) (2008) (limiting probation to "[t]wo 
years, for any violent felony," "[ejighteen months" for specified offenses, and "[o]ne 
year" for other offenses); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 948.04(1) (West 2004) (ordering probation 
"not to exceed 2 years" for felonies "unless otherwise specified by the court"); Ga. Code 
Ann. § 42-8-34.1(g) (2001) (ordering probation to be no "more than a total of two years 
for any one offense or series of offenses arising out of the same transaction. . ."); Haw. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 706-623(1) (2006) (limiting probation to ten or five years, depending 
on crime); 730 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/5-6-2(b) (West 2005) (limiting probation to four 
years or 30 months, depending on crime); Iowa Code Ann. § 907.7(1) (West 2008) 
(requiring probatioii "not 1o exceed five years" for felonies); Kan. Stat. \nr.. ': ^ • 
4611(a) (2000) (same); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.020(4) (West 2002) (ordering 
probation for felonies not to "exceed five (5) years, or the time necessary to complete 
restitution, whichever is longer"); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 893 (2008) (ordering 
that probation shall not be "more than five years"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, 
15 
jurisdictions have expressly noted that it "make[s] sense for" the legislating body to limit 
the length of probation by statute because research shows "that the rehabilitative purpose 
of probation can be accomplished, if at all, within five years." Albano, 698 F.2d at 149 
(citations omitted); see Angle, 353 N.W.2d at 425 ("We believe [our probation statute] 
reflects the attitude of correctional authorities that rehabilitation will occur within five 
years or not at all." (citation omitted)); Oliver, 490 A.2d at 248 ("'The experts in this area 
have generally argued that the rehabilitative purpose of probation can be achieved, if at 
all, within five years'" (citations omitted)). The remainder, however, have simply "held 
or assumed, usually with little or no discussion, that the statute limits the total period of 
probation" to the time specified. Albano, 698 F.2d at 146 (citations omitted). 
Some of these jurisdictions recognize additional purposes for probation—such as 
protecting society or enforcing restitution—and expressly allow longer probationary 
§1202(1) (2006) (authorizing probation "not to exceed 4 years" for class A crimes); Md. 
Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-222(a)(3)(i) (West 2005) (prohibiting probation from 
exceeding five years); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.2a(l) (West 2006) (same); Miss. 
Code Ann. § 47-7-37 (2006) (same); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.016(1) (2005) (same); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 29-2263(1) (2003) (same); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.500(1) (2007) (same); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:2(V) (2007) (same); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:45-2(a) (2007) 
(ordering probation "not to exceed the maximum term which could have been imposed or 
more than 5 years whichever is lesser"); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20-5(A) (2003) (ordering 
that probation for felony "shall not exceed five years"); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00(3)(a)(i) 
(McKinney 2006) (same); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1342(a) (West 1995) (same); N.D. 
Cen. Code Ann. § 12.1-32-06.1(1) (2007) (same); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2951.07 (West 
2002) (same); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-440(6) (1992) (same); S.D. Cod. Laws §25-4A-6 
(1994) (same); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.96.050 (2002) (requiring parole not to exceed 
three years); W. Va. Code § 62-12-11 (West 1953) (prohibiting probation from exceeding 
five years); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.09(2)(b) (West 2006) (requiring probation for felony 
not to exceed three years); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301(a) (West 2000) (authorizing 
"probation for a term not to exceed five (5) years"). 
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pei' - . . See, e.g., A. : »• l- ^ Ou--.. . -• •'• -
probation from exceeding "25 years for a felony sex offense"); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
13-902(a) (authorizing probation up to seven years for specified crimes); Haw. Rev Stat. 
Ann. § 706-623(1) (ai ithorizing j : i obatioi i 1 lp to tci 1 yc ai s (01 specified ci ii 1 ics); Kai i Stat. 
iViin. § 21-4611(a), (ex 7; f l o w i n g that probation iii "nonsupport of a child" cases "may 
be continued as long as the responsibility for support continues"); Ky. Rev. Stat Arr § 
533.020(4) (ordering probation for felonies not to "exceed \\\ .• . *;. v. JI -
necessary to ecu. i tplel e restiti ition, whicnuvur is longer"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 
1202(1-A)(A)(1) (2007) (allowing probation in felony cases to last up to eighteen years if 
victim was a child). 
Likewise • '-• -:• ( , .^M, IV -• U ior a few unique crimes, 
special probationary purposes exist and require longer probationary periods. See, e.g., 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(2) (Supp. 2008) (allowing probation periods in certain 
sexual offense „...: ;I cases "I«M n\ h>,i r u*i • iiiiiini M,l leu \ rars"^); State v. 
Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, p o , 69 P.3d 1278 (purpose of probation allowed under section 
76-5-406.5 "'is to avoid compounding the harm already suffered while protecting the 
V L : .. • ) . 
Finally, "[a] few jurisdictions leave the matter entirely in the court's discretion or 
permit probation to extend to the maximum sentence of confinement authorized by 
statute." LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862.4 This , 1 lowevei is t he mil i :>rity 
4
 See, e.g., Ida. Code Ann. § 19-2601(7) (2005) (authorizing probation for felonies 
"f i period of not more than the maximum period for which the defendant might have 
17 
approach and is regarded as "unwise." Id. "'Such open-ended authority not only may 
subject the offender to a pointlessly extended jeopardy, but it aggravates the caseload 
burden of the probation staff as well.'" Id. (quoting 3 ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice § 18-2.3 commentary at 18-81 (2d ed. 1980)). Thus, "[mjodern statutes make no 
attempt to tie the term of probation to the often lengthy authorized term of 
been imprisoned"); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-2(c) (West 2008) (same); Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. ch. 279 § 1 (West 1998) (authorizing probation "for such time" as the court "shall 
fix"); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 137.545(1 )(a) (West 2005) (same); 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 
9754(a) (West 2007) (authorizing probation that "may not exceed the maximum term for 
which the defendant could be confined"); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §12-19-13 (1972) (same); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(c)(l) (2007) (same); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 205(a)(2) 
(2008) (same). 
Unlike the majority of jurisdictions, at least some of these jurisdictions recognize 
purposes for probation beyond rehabilitation and apply these purposes generally, rather 
than to certain specified crimes. See, e.g., State v. Mummert, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 
(Idaho 1977) ("The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be 
rehabilitated under proper control and supervision."); Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 
(Ind. 1999) (listing "avoiding incarceration" and "permitting the offender to meet the 
offender's financial obligations" as purposes of probation); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 
841 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Mass. 2006) ("The purpose of probation rather than immediate 
execution of a term of imprisonment 'in large part is to enable the [convicted] person to 
get on his feet, to become law abiding and to lead a useful and upright life under the 
fostering influence of the probation officer.'" (citation omitted) (alteration in original)); 
Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 743 N.E.2d 856, 859 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (listing 
"'rehabilitation of the probationer and protection of the public'" as purposes of probation 
(citations omitted)); State v. Martin, 580 P.2d 536, 539 (Or. 1978) ("The purposes of 
probation include rehabilitation and the freedom of the individual, as long as these are 
consistent with public safety.'" (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Hartman, 908 A.2d 
316, 320 (Pa. Super. 2006) ("'A probation order is . . . designed to rehabilitate a criminal 
defendant while still preserving the rights of law-abiding citizens to be secure in their 
persons and property.'" (citation omitted)); State v. Campbell, 833 A.2d 1228, 1233 (R.I. 
2003) ("Probation is intended to serve a rehabilitative function by allowing a defendant 
the opportunity to show by his conduct that incarceration is no longer necessary."); State 
v. Lockwood, 632 A.2d 655, 659 (Vt. 1993) ("Probation is intended to allow a defendant 
an opportunity for rehabilitation at the same time it protects society." (citation omitted)). 
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• i - •  - . ' '"i- w .irs for felonies 
and one or two years for misdemeanors." Id. (citations omitted); see supra at n.3. 
Like the majority of other jurisdictions, it appears from A^ language of I Italy's 
probation stall ite tl tat 01 it Lcgislati in c i a idci si ood tl ic: :i:: u lgers ofloi ig probatioi lary periods 
ai id intended to limit tl ic length of probation that a trial court may impose. See I Jtal i 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005). Utah's probation statute says: "Probation 
may be terminated at any tit i le a1 tl ic disci el I ii i :>( tl lie coi irt or upon comple t ion wi thout 
viola t ion ol 36 nlonths probat ion in felony or class A m i s d e m e a n o r cases , or 12 mon ths 
in eases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions." Id. (emphasis added). 
The Legislature adopted, this language in 1989. See Ui *.; 
l(7)(a) (v-pp. ••'>*' ;^ h»-e 1989, the probation statute said: "Upon completion without 
violation ol^ 18 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months 
in class B misdemeanor cases, the offender shall be terminated from sentence atid the 
supeiA tsiuNt ul iln" I >i\ isiiun ul't 'omvlu HIP, unless the person is earlier terminated by the 
court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim Supp 1984). 
Despite the provision regarding 12 or 36 months, this Court determined ni Wallace 
that the "cur •* • . • lalion on tlle 
length of probationary term that a court may impose." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at fflfl 1, 13. 
To reach this conclusion, this Court compared the current statute to its previous version. 
id. at fj|l 1. Before 1989. tl ic pi obatioi i si ati il e ' ci cale ;:! a ! si re i ig i i lai idale 1: >y :)i dei ing 
that "the probation period shall be terminated" upon successful completion of "18 
months' probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases." Id.; see Utah Code Ann. § 
19 
77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984). In 1989, however, "the Legislature modified the 
statute to its current form, substituting 'may' for 'shall.'" Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^11 
(citation omitted); see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(a) (Supp. 1989). 
As acknowledged by this Court, Wallace's interpretation of the statute makes "the 
provision regarding 36 months . . . nearly meaningless, since the court may terminate 
probation 'at any time.'" Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^13. This Court could not remedy this 
"defect," however, "without inserting meaningful terms that simply are not there." Id 
Although a drafting "defect" prevented this Court from giving meaning to "the 
provision regarding 36 months," id., the Legislature's inclusion of this provision strongly 
indicates that it intended to limit probation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i); see 
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98,1J30, 104 P.3d 1208 (holding that when 
"examining the plain language" of a statute or ordinance to discern its meaning, appellate 
courts "must assume that each term included in the ordinance was used advisedly" 
(citation omitted)); Versluis v. Guaranty Nat. Companies, 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992) 
(noting that when construing a statute, this Court will "presume that the Legislature used 
each term advisedly, and [will] give effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning" (citation omitted)); Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, 
B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 513, 518 n.21 (Utah) ("Whenever possible, statutes should be 
construed so that no portion is superfluous."), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 869 (1993). This is 
especially true, given that the Legislature included the limiting language without any 
reference to "discretion of the court." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). 
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The CLS'.i!".1 .: : . - aLIOII is further revealed by 
legislative history. The Legislature adopted the pre-1989 version of the probation statute 
in 1984 for the express purpose of :\:. :ung AK ivin^Ui *>i probation. See S.B. 91 Day 20, 
Budget Si • s, 1V84, '•• • •-. . .oi live years later, 
in 1989, the Legislature passed tlic currciit version of the statute without anv discussion, 
thereby suggesting that the Legislature only intended to expand 11ic lent;::. *>i probation 
permitted and iml lo revoke il , userarcliiiu \n\\n
 ( in Inn Ii> lnu»th ul piuhahuii 
1989 Utah Laws 689-91, Ch. 226, §1, H.B. 314. 
Thereafter, the Legislature did iiot amend the statute to remove the provision 
regarding iz *?r *-t* ,\i---: '•; - ,^ \ ic coi u t of appeals, stai i ii ig in 1993, ii il erpi etcd 
that pt ^*. »' as imputing a 12- or 30-month limitation on probation. See McDonald, 
2005 UT App 86 at [^19 (holding probation statute "limits probation for any particular 
class C misdemeanor to twelve months" (citation omitted)), cert, denied, 124 I'.3d 251 
(Utah 2005); Robinson, 860 r.zu y/y ai y&2 ^ noting ••maximum formal probation 
periods" for misdemeanors and felonies "are respectively twelve months and thirty-six 
months" (citation omitted)), cert, denied, h M'.~d.. . s-i < :..• ,v/4). 
Fmllu'i ii! nlhei sl.ilutr,. nui 1 egisliihire lias delinralrd probationary purposes 
beyond rehabilitation for particular crimes and has legislatively-defined longer 
probationary periods to accomplish those special purposes. See, e.g., Uuiii i/uUvj . ,n.i. § 
76-5 • -IJ M . . , -, • < t . * nses 
"for up to a maximum often years"); Pritchett, 69 P.3d at 1285-86 (purpose of probation 
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allowed under section 76-5-406.5 ";is to avoid compounding the harm already suffered 
while protecting the victim from further abuse'" (citation omitted)). 
In this case, the trial court imposed 108 months (nine years) of probation. R. 246; 
270:35. This probationary period is three times as long as the 36-month probationary 
limit apparently contemplated by the Legislature, and far longer than necessary to 
determine whether Candedo can be successfully rehabilitated. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-1(10)(a)(i); National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report, 
§ 3105 comment at 282 (1971). Rather than conveying society's desire to see Candedo 
successfully reintegrated into society, such a lengthy probationary period conveys 
society's distrust of Candedo and its desire to see him fail. This undermines the 
rehabilitative purposes of probation because it feeds "any existing feelings of inferiority 
or resentment" rather than "bringing about [] a well-disposed attitude toward society and 
its laws." Bame, 347 P.2d at 559. 
The trial court said that it was imposing a nine-year probationary term "because of 
the amount o f restitution that Candedo had "to pay back." R. 270:35. Restitution, 
however, is not a legislatively-stated goal of probation in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-27-1 (10).5 Although the trial court may order the defendant to pay restitution as a 
3
 A few jurisdictions recognize enforcing restitution as a purpose of probation, but 
these jurisdictions, particularly those that intend to expand the allowable probationary 
period for purposes of enforcing restitution, clearly express this intent in their statutes and 
carefully define the expansion permitted. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(c) 
(2006) (allowing court to extend probation "not more than five years" if "court has 
required, as a condition of probation, that the defendant make restitution . . . and that 
condition has not been satisfied"); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-222(b)(l)(i) (West 
2005) (allowing court to extend probation for "an additional 5 years" "[f|or the purpose 
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condition of pi obatioi i, tl ic Code expressly for bids tl ic 1 1 ial cc in 1 froi n exl ei idii ig tl ic 
probationary period in order to enforce restitution. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18-
l(8)(a)(ix), 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A), 77~38a-501(2)(b). 
' v I rile oi i pi obal ic I i at id as a coi iditi :)i i of pi c 1: •< t l i :: -\ i , ' ' a 1 I ial coi u t I t lay order a 
defendant to "make restitution or reparatioii to tlic victii11 or victims." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-1 (8)(a)(ix). The phrase "[w]hile on probation" gives trial courts authority to make 
restitution a condition of probation while ;i^ LI^U.M.- . . : .•••:'.. Id.; see State v. 
Dickey, 8< ( 1 P 2d 1203, 1205-09 (Utah U . /vpp. i^92j . Bui it does not give trial courts 
the broader authority to extend a probationary period until restitution is paid. See Smith, 
803 P.2d at 7C-1 , ;K. trial court's power to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely 
statutory, *• • • i nil 1 las discrel ioi i in 1 1 lese I i lattei s. tl :ie coi n t's discretion 
must be exercised within the limits imposed by the legislature."). 
"If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(lOYaYiV .-, , ns"resti* • - i 
jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited 
purpose of enforcing the payment of [restitution]." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
vA); see icLal • %ose 
sanctions against the defendant" if he "defaults in tl payment of a judgment for 
restitution or any installment ordered." Id at § 77-38a-501(l) (2003). But, the "court 
of making restitution"); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.020(4) (West 2002) (prohibiting 
probation for felonies from exceeding five years "or the time necessary to complete 
restitution, whichever is longer"). 
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may not impose a sanction" if "the sanction would extend the defendant's term of 
probation or parole." Id at § 77-38a-501(2)(b). 
The Legislature's decision to exclude restitution as a goal of probation makes 
sense because the purposes of probation and restitution are naturally at odds. The 
purpose of probation in Utah is rehabilitation. Slee Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10). It is a 
discretionary order generally reserved for "young or unhardened offenders]." Roberts, 
320 U.S. at 272; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(2)(c)-(d) (Supp. 2008) (saying trial 
court "may sentence" a defendant "to probation" or "to imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(2)(a) (saying trial court "may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution 
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation"). 
While restitution may also have rehabilitative qualities, rehabilitation is not the 
main goal of restitution. Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1209; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-
302(5)(c)(iii) (Supp. 2008) (listing "rehabilitative effect on the defendant" as one 
consideration for "determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution"). Rather, the main goal of restitution is "repay [ing] victims." Dickey, 841 
P.2d at 1209 (citations omitted). 
As explained above, achieving rehabilitation (whether directly, through probation, 
or indirectly, through restitution) will take "a relatively short period of time." National 
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report, § 3105 comment at 282 
(1971). Research shows it "can be accomplished, if at all, within five years." Albano, 
698 F.2d at 149 (citations omitted). Whereas, repaying victims may take many years. 
See, e.g., R. 270:34-35. Thus, extending probation until restitution is complete would 
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"pointlessly extend jcopiinh" hv\ mnl (In hum (he of tenth i i-, i Jhilulifated, LaFave, 
Criminal Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862; aggravate AP&P's "caseload burdens" by 
increasing the length of time individuals must be supervised, id,; and threaten to urn:o the 
1 el labilil atioi i ah eady acl lie ^ cd 1: } f I i lakii lg 1 1 le defet idai it feel like ai i oi itsidci even when 
he is living by society's rules. See Baine, 347 P.2d at 559. 
The better approach is the approach apparently contemplated by our Legislature: 
nnrize a probal ic i lai y pei iod 1 1 lat is Hi i lil cd I o 1 1 le 1 ii \ ic i lecessai y foi I el labilil at ion, 
but allow the trial court to continue the defendant on bench probation after probation is 
complete in order to enforce the restiti!':.:!> ..:J^ See Utah Code Ann. §§77-18-
l(8)(a)(ix), 77- i - • -^VaViiV ... , . ^ .- .
 { ,: h. 
. on ^uiLuiu, as interpreted by Wallace, violates due process 
because it does not rationally further the Legislature's stated legitimate interest in 
rehabilitation- . > ;K contrary i* actually undermines probation's rehar ;iau\ e LUU^ ny 
makin : i-i'-. ' • \,i^w i iivii:<: ;\\ socict) "s rules, adding 
to the overcrowding of prisons and jails, and diluting AP&P's already meager resources. 
Thus, this Court should reverse and remand for resentencing because the Iliile-year 
"'»' i »lt<il ion.11; , lei ordered, tn < Jm led n \ e,iM* e\eeed J i n I! mil , i il \ uip.l i lulh diali ly. 
Ihis Court Should Reverse Because Candedo's Nine-Year Probationary 
Period Implicates a Fundamental Liberty Interest and Is Not Narrowly 
Tailored to Serve a Compelling State Interest 
"The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the 'liberty' it 
protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint v Washington v. 
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Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (citation omitted). 'The Clause also provides 
heightened protections against government interference with certain fundamental rights 
and liberty interests." IdL at 720 (citations omitted). 
In order to establish whether a liberty interest is fundamental, the United States 
Supreme Court has outlined an analysis with "two primary features." Id. at 720-21. 
First, the Supreme Court has "required in substantive-due-process cases a 'careful 
description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." Id. at 721 (citations omitted). 
Second, it has "regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those 
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.'" Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 
(internal and end citations omitted). "Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices 
thus provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,' that direct and 
restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 721 (internal citation omitted). 
Utah's probation statute, as interpreted by Wallace, allows trial courts to impose 
probation for as long as they like, even for the rest of a probationer's life. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i); Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at «||13. This is true of all criminal 
offenses, even infractions. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). Thus, a "'careful 
description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest" before this Court is "whether the 
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes" the right of a person 
who has been selected as a young or unhardened offender likely to succeed on probation 
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to regain 1 lis libci ty 01 ice 1 1 ic pi n poses oi pi obation ai e coi t lplete. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
at 720-21, 723. 
In Utali, the legislatively-stated purpose of probation is rehabilitation. Probation 
achieves i\.um\:. ... •.. 
iiilplics, to prove 1limself." Baine, 347 P.2d at 557. "For this purpose the defendant is 
required to agree to specified standards of conduct; and his continued liberty is dependent 
upon compliance with them.'' Id. Likewise, uthe freedoi i i 1 ic enjoys is Hi i lited ai id is 
sub; . v - ; : :. - • ••'.; ,.! . -Miuiib. id. 
In other words, in order to achieve rehabilitation, probation is expressly designed 
to limit a defendant's freedom by compelling hinI to comply with specific standards of 
CO * ' ' I i l ^ L\l..! ML" 
first, fourth, and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution), and constantly 
threatening him with incarceration. See I Jtah Code Ann. § 77-18-1; Samson, 547 I J.S. at 
848 ("'"pi obatioi iei s 'dc l lot ei ljoy """"1 1 ic absoh ite libci i; '* " of otl ICI c i t izens" (cv: 
omit ted)) ; Nacht iga l , 507 U.S . at 5 ("liberty iilfringement [is] caused by a term of 
probat ion ' ' ) ; Blanton, 489 U.S . at 542 ("probatioii may engender ' a significant 
infrinpomcnt of personal f r eedom'" (citation - ;); United States v. Heath. \ 
1312, 1316 n.2 (11 th Cir. 2005) (explaining that probat ion subjects defendants to certain 
' " l imi ta t ions to which ordinary cit izens are f r e e ' " because they ' " h a v e been convicted of 
cr imes and have thereby given the state a compel l ing interest in limit;! ; xx-} • -
ordei 1 o effcel \ late tl leii i cl labilital ioi I ai id t ;.) protect society.'" (citation omitted)); 
A.C.C., 2002 UT 22 at 1|24 (c"[I]nherent in the very nature of probation is that 
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probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled."5 
(citation omitted)); Smith, 803 P.2d at 793 ("The general nature of probation places 
significant restrictions on the liberty of the person placed on probation" (citation 
omitted)); Cowdell 626 P.2d at 489 (probationers have "limited procedural rights" and a 
"restricted . . . right to personal liberty"); R. 246. 
A defendant does not have a right to be put on probation. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201(2) (saying trial court "may sentence" a defendant "to probation" or "to 
imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a) (saying trial court "may, after imposing 
sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation"); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (defining probation as an "act of grace by the court 
suspending the imposition or execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon 
prescribed conditions"); State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 730 (Utah 1980) ("Probation 
is a discretionary matter with the trial judge." (citations omitted)); State v. Sibert, 310 
P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957) (same). Rather, probation is generally reserved for the "young 
or unhardened offender" who is likely to benefit from "an opportunity to rehabilitate 
himself without institutional confinement under the tutelage of a probation official and 
under the continuing power of the court to impose institutional punishment for his 
original offense in the event that he abuse this opportunity." Roberts, 320 U.S. at 272. 
But if a defendant is selected as one of the "young or unhardened offenders]" 
likely to be rehabilitated and is placed on probation, then he has a fundamental interest in 
regaining his liberty once the purposes of probation are complete. IcL Accordingly, the 
State may not continue to limit his constitutional rights and impose burdensome standards 
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of con* I iic I bevoinl llu linn tlt.il i h r i r lihrrly restrict «'•!• •• :• "IUII i o\\ l\ tailored to serve a 
compel l ing state interest."' Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citation omitted). 
Rehabilitation, Utah's legislatively-stated purpose of probation, . . ^ c y a 
coi i ipellii ig state ii i1 eresl See United States v. Cothran, 8:^ • '" " ly , / 3 i \' 
1988). Thus, so long as the length of a probationary period is ""narrowly tailored to 
serve5" the Legislature's stated interest in rehabilitation, it is permissible. Glucksberg, 
521 1 1.S. ail; 721 (cil atic i i oi :t litl c :1) i : v..s explaii icd it l sect i :: \ i. I ' ' \ „ i el labilitatioi i, if ii is 
achieved at all, will be achieved "within a relatively short period of t ime." National 
Commiss ion on Reform o f Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report, § 3105 c o m m e n t at 282 
(1971) . Research s hows fh • 'h: " ... 
accomplished, if at all, within five years." Albano, 698 F.2d at 149 (citations omitted); 
see Oliver, 4 9 0 A.2d at 248 (same); Angle , 353 N.W.2d at 425 (same); Lancer, 508 F.2d 
at 739 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (same): v ; vp . ustice, 2 Attorney General's Survey 
of Release Procedures, n^^\ • • -: * ..- >. .thieved within a 
relatively short period, generally 2 years," and "[tjhere is no justification for continuing 
probationary oversight beyond 5 years"). 
Ill pi obati :»! I lasts bey or id tl lis t ii I IC, ill I n id< ;TI i lii ics ii s i el n ibilitat ive go« lis by n lakii ig 
the probationer continue to feel like an outsider even when he is l iving by society's rules, 
thereby resurrecting his "feelings of inferiority or resentment'"
 ti:;u UY>\ :,:L. i.«m to retiim 
i J a i n e , j - i • - f 
prisons and jails , and dilutes A P & P ' s already meager resources. See LaFave, Criminal 
Procedure, § 26.9(a) , at 862 (noting statutes that do not limit the length o f probation may 
29 
'"aggravate^ the caseload burden of the probation staff" (citation omitted)); Petersilia, 
Probation in the United States, at 157 ("In recent years, probation agencies have 
struggled—with continued meager resources—to upgrade services and supervision."). 
Recognizing that long probationary periods are counterproductive to rehabilitation, 
the federal government and most states have enacted statutes that "set a uniform 
maximum such as five years for felonies and one or two years for misdemeanors." 
LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862 (citation omitted); see supra at n.3. Some 
of these jurisdictions allow probationary periods longer than five years, but these periods 
are generally reserved for particular crimes and carry a legislatively-stated purpose 
beyond rehabilitation. See supra at Part I.A. Likewise, our Legislature has identified a 
few specific crimes that necessitate probationary purposes beyond rehabilitation and has 
statutorily-defined a longer probationary period in order to achieve those special 
purposes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(2); Pritchett, 2003 UT 24 at <p0. 
Accordingly, in Utah, except for a few specifically identified crimes, probation 
that lasts beyond the period necessary to achieve rehabilitation—approximately five 
years—violates due process because it is not "'narrowly tailored to serve'" the 
Legislature's interest in rehabilitation. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citation omitted). 
As explained in section I.A., the trial court imposed 108 months (nine years) of 
probation in this case. R. 246; 270:35. This probationary period is three times as long as 
the 36-month probationary limit apparently contemplated by the Legislature, four years 
longer than the five-year time period identified by research as beneficial to rehabilitation 
and followed by the federal government and most states, and far longer than necessary to 
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determii ic A/1 ic! 1 lei Candedo can be successf •••• 's ] ' • :;. ^cc Utah Loci-.- \ • • s 77-
18-l (10)(a)( i ) ; Nat ional Commissioi1 on Reform of Federal Cr iminal L a w s , Final Report , 
§ 3 1 0 5 comment at 282 (1971) ; supra at n .3 . 
'.I hus, tl lis ( Tri n 1 si 101 ild appb f a I icigl itened degree ol sci i il ii ly becai tse ( "ai idedo's 
nine-year probationary period iinplicates 1lis fundamental liberty interest in regaining his 
freedom once the purposes of probation are fulfilled. Further, this Court should reverse 
because Candedo's nine-year probat ions- . . • :-••,. 
coi I ipelling si i:>. " • • ;Vi. 
IL I HE C O U R T OF APPEALS ERRED W H E N IT H E L D T H A T 
CANDEDO'S DUE PROCESS A R G U M E N T COULD N O T BE 
RAISED UNDER RULE 22(c) 
II' ill V.lc ) nil I IK Mt ili I' iili". nM 'I iniinnl Prui i dure says "|'t |he court may correct 
an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.'' I Jtah R. 
Crim. P. 22(e). ' T h e purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow correction of manifestly illegal 
sentences." State v. Telford, 2002 I ) 1 51,1]5, ! 8 I \3< 1 228 (fi x )ti ic >le < )i i litl ed). : ' A s si id i, 
rule 22(e) claims are not restricted by time limits for bringing notice of appeal. Nor are 
they waived by failure to raise them at the first opportunity before the district court/' IdL 
'"This makes theoretical sei ise becai isc ai i illegal sci itci ice is void ai i :i , lil ;:e issi ics of 
jurisdiction, [may be raised] at any time.'" Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original). 
Relying on language in Wallace, the court of appeals declined to use rule 22(e) to 
reach Candedo's due process argument. See Candedo, 2008 I IT • : \ pp < \ at ^|6 Ii i Wallace, 
this L,oui " twelve-year probatioii does not const i tute an illegal sen tence ." 
Wal lace , 2006 U T 86 at ^16 . Citing this language, the court of appeals concluded that if 
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the twelve-year probation in Wallace was not an illegal sentence, then "Candedo's nine-
year probation is not an illegal sentence." Candedo, 2008 UT App 4 at *\}6. 
The court of appeal's reliance on Wallace, however, was misplaced. In Wallace, 
this Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide whether the language of the probation 
statute "creates a thirty-six-month limitation for a term of probation as to any felony 
conviction." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at *(|4. The defendant did not argue and this Court did 
not decide the follow-up question—whether the probation statute, as interpreted by 
Wallace, is constitutional. Id. Thus, this Court's holding in Wallace does not decide the 
issue in this case—whether Candedo's sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal 
manner because the range authorized by the probation statute is unconstitutional. 
In further justification of its decision not to reach Candedo's due process issue, the 
court of appeals asserted that rule 22(e) only applies "where either 'the sentencing court 
has no jurisdiction, or . . . the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range.'" 
Candedo, 2008 UT App 4 at 1|6 (quoting State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, TJ5 n.l, 48 P.3d 
228). This narrow reading of rule 22(e) is contrary to this Court's case law. 
In Telford, this court did not limit rule 22(e) to the two circumstances identified by 
the court of appeals. See Telford, 2002 UT 51 at ^5 n. 1. Rather, it presented those two 
circumstances as examples of illegal sentences. Id. When this Court said that "rule 22(e) 
claims must be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse," it referred to the circumstance 
where a defendant invokes rule 22(e) to challenge the underlying conviction rather than 
the sentence. Id at [^5 (citing State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ffi[3-4, 40 P.3d 630 (declining 
to reach denial of rule 22(e) motion because defendant "attacks his guilty plea" rather 
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tl lai i *"ic: ci isii. ig c i i 1 1 ic dci lial of his n ilc 22(c) i nol ioi f )). Becai ise 1 .1 lat cii ci in isl ai ice is so 
common, this Court has had to make clear that rule 22(e) is not a vehicle for raising 
unpreserved challenges to the underlying conviction. See, e.g., State v. Nicholls, 2006 
UT76,1|5, I- . - • :. • ••••' ' •— •. f 
the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction" 
(alteration 'w original) (citations omitted)); Telford, 2002 UT 51 at ^ 6 - 7 (same); Reyes, 
2002 U'i i,V-3, 5 (sai i ic); State v. Finlayson, 200* . . • -" ' • 
(same); State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) (same). 
When the defendant is challenging his sentence aiid not tlic underlying conviction, 
however, the language of rule 22(e) is "sweeping." Brooks, 9i^ > ._.. \ l \ 1 
I: las i ioi listed "all types of errors that i nay qualify for review under rule 22(e)." State v. 
Samora, 2004 UT 79, ^{13, 99 P.3d 858. -,.i\ ii has determined that rule 22(e) is broad 
enough to encompass constitutional \ iv>lalions, as in this case, as well as violations of 
i i lies ai id si all ites. See, e.g., Samora, . :' - ? - • ; "sei il ei ice in lposed ii \ 
violation of rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure may be considered a 
'sentence imposed in an illegal manner' under rule 22(e)" (citation omitted)); State v. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, psi n l996 ) i ' le 
22(e) because statute did uilot authorize a consecutive, determinate two-year term"); 
Kuehnert v. Turner, 499 P.2d 839-41 (Utah 1975) (concluding sentence was illegal 
because del ei idai it did i ioi 1 1a1 > e coi n isel, w< is i iot ii ii c i I i led oil Si; ciLl i <• \ I i ici ldmei it I igl il s 
during sentencing, and had not knowinH\ and intelligently waived those rights). 
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In particular, this Court has held that rule 22(e) is broad enough to encompass 
sentences that violate due process, as Candedo argues in this case. See Telford, 2002 UT 
51 at TflJ2-4. In Telford, this Court invoked rule 22(e) to reach the defendant's argument 
that indeterminate sentencing violates Utah's due process clause. Telford, 2002 UT 51 at 
l|[l|f2-4 (also using rule 22(e) to reach defendant's argument that indeterminate sentencing 
violates both state and federal cruel and unusual punishment provisions). 
Indeed, in cases other than Candedo's, the court of appeals itself has recognized 
this Court's ruling that rule 22(e) encompasses constitutional violations. See, e.g., State 
v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32,1fifl8-l9, 177 P.3d 637. In Garner, issued shortly after its 
decision in Candedo, the court of appeals used rule 22(e) to reach the defendant's "attack 
on the constitutionality of his sentence, and Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme in 
general." IdL at Tf20; see also State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58, 2002 WL 287890, at * 1 
(memorandum decision) ("Utah law has no comprehensive definition of sentences 
'imposed in an illegal manner'; however, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a 
sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during sentencing." (citation and footnote omitted) (attached 
at Addendum F)). 
In sum, the court of appeals erred by holding Candedo's due process claim was 
"not reviewable under rule 22(e)." See Candedo, 2008 UT App 4 at [^6. This decision 
was contrary to the "sweeping" language of rule 22(e), as interpreted by this Court. 
Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860; see Samora, 2004 UT 79 at V3; Telford, 2002 UT 51 at ffi[2-4; 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 551; Kuehnert, 499 P.2d at 839-41. And it was inconsistent 
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n\ 1 i il • ;n n i case \w v. See Garner , 2008 1 f I Vp) >• 32 ; it ^ | 1 8 - 2 0 ; I Icad ley , 2 ( H ) " -V L 
287890 , at * 1. 11ms, this Cour t should reverse the court of appea l s ' decision aiid use rule 
22(e) to address Candedo's due process claim on the merits. 
ill I ' I 'HE CUUK1 Ub APPEALS ERRED WHEN 1 1 H L L D l h / v i 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT JUSTIFY 
REACHING CANDEDO'S DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT 
The exceptional circiimstances doctrine applies "where [an appellate coiirt's] 
failure to coi isidei ai i issi ie tl i< it was i lot pi o{ )ei ly preserved foi aj )peal" * /ill i csi ill "ii I 
manifest injustice." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, j^23, 94 P.3d 186. This 
Court regards the exceptional circumstances doctrine as a '"safety device'" that protects 
against su*./. injustice. I d , (citatioi is oi i litted). ()i ie ai ea \ vl lei e tl lis Coi n 1 applies tl ie 
exceptioilal circumstances doctrine is in cases involving "rare procedural anomalies." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993). 
For example, in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (\ -.• •" • . : :r.s Court "ei I lployed 
the 'exceptloiiid i nvinn^tamvs' ruhrie where a t :.;uiy,e in iaw ui me settled interpretation 
of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 
(Utah Ct App. 1996) (quoting Lopez, 87 - r .:u .-.* I • -.• sp, , \ .^,\\\\ hat case. "[t]he 
. •
 5
 u Liui 1ie 
had been s topped on a pre tex t . " IcL (cit ing L o p e z , 873 P.2d at 1129) . T h e State appealed 
and w h e n the case r eached this Court , "defendant argued for the first I IUK thai LUC * MM! 
.I)1 i l l I I ui'I (lit pie 11. \( »lii|i d» ii Inn1 I" lit i '" >lnl m pi r \ IMOIIS ol llir 1 fl.ih ( 'mi'.I iliitmn 
even if it 1leld the Fourt lI A m e n d m e n t did not require such a doc t r ine . " IcL (cit ing Lopez , 
873 P.2d at 1134 n.2) . This Cour t "found except ional c i rcumstances existed and 
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addressed the state constitutional issue because, at the time of the suppression hearing, 
the pretext doctrine cwas the controlling rule of Fourth Amendment law as interpreted by 
the court of appeals.'" Id. (citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134 n.2). 
Similarly, in State v. Hasten, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) (per curiam), rev'g State 
v. Hasten, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), "defendant challenged his conviction for 
attempted second degree murder because the jury was allowed to consider depraved 
indifference as a culpable state of mind for that offense." Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10 (citing 
Hasten, 846 P.2d at 1277). "Defendant had not raised that issue at trial." Id, (citing 
Hasten, 846 P.2d at 1277). But, in a case decided after defendant's trial, this Court "held 
that Utah does not recognize the crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide." Id. 
(citation omitted). Although defendant did not properly raise the issue below, this Court 
utilized the exceptional circumstances doctrine to reach defendant's claim because it 
"determined that it would be 'manifestly unjust' to leave him incarcerated for something 
that is not recognized as a crime in Utah." Id. (quoting Hasten, 846 P.2d at 1277) 
(internal footnote omitted). 
In this case, the court of appeals declined to invoke the exceptional circumstances 
doctrine to review Candedo's substantive due process claim. See Candedo, 2008 UT 
App 4 at ffif7-9. It concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist because 
"Candedo was always free to assert" his due process claim before the trial court. 
Candedo, 2008 UT App 4 at ^|8. Further, it concluded that Candedo "should have" 
anticipated "that his due process rights were arguably implicated" when "the trial court 
imposed such a long period of probation." Id 
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. ,i i l l jCes require 
review in this case. On September 12, 2005, the day Candedo was sentenced, Utah case 
law interpreted the probation statute as imposing a 36-month liiilit on probation. See 
McDonald, 2005 UI , ' • rtcen an< ,,., • • 
probation order exceeded its statutory authority, which limits probation for any particular 
class C misdemeanor to twelve months"); Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982 (noting "maximum 
fo-
il was not uiill 1 after Candedo appealed his case that this Court issued Wallace. 
See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 (issued Dec. 19, 2006). In Wallace, this Court overruled 
McDonald and Robinson ai:*. .; • . -. • ..•,." » 
statutory Nation on tlic lungln of probation a uiai court ma} impose." Wallace, 2006 
UT86ar„ 
Accordingly, at the tin^ he was sentenced, i aiuk .K I;.-... no warning in.:; "le 
neede- • : .".. • *• • •: • • ocess because, as 
interpreted by Utah law, it did ilot. See id. He could not be expected lo predict that this 
Court would issue a decision that overruled settled case law ..iu. reinterpreted tlle 
:
 • ' *' UJ. W'atkiss & Saperstein v. 
Williams, 931 P.2d 840, 846 (Utah 1996) (noting, as part of ineffective assistance of 
counsel discussion, that attorneys '"need not be clairvoyant and foresee future changes in 
1111" I a w " ' ( c 11 ' 11 i ' ii i i 11 i 1111 It i i II i li I 11 j I i i 11111II11 I n i < n I \ \ II 11 i | 11 i i I in I I 11 r i \ 11 > I i | ! 11 11 H I 11 
iniplications this Court's future decision would raise and to present those implications to 
the trial court. Id 
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This is especially true given that at the time Candedo was sentenced, McDonald 
and Robinson appeared to be settled case law. The provision regarding 36 months had 
been in the probation statute since 1989. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(a) (Supp. 
1989). The court of appeals interpretation of that provision had been published and 
followed since 1993. See McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at If 19; Robinson, 860 P.2d at 
982. In all that time, the Legislature had not amended the provision. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2008). Nor had this Court corrected the court of appeals' 
erroneous interpretation, despite opportunities to do so. See State v. McDonald, 124 P.3d 
251 (Utah 2005) (denying a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' 
decision in McDonald); State v. Robinson, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994) (denying a 
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in Robinson). 
After Wallace, it appears that the court of appeals' interpretation of the probation 
statute was not based on an in-depth analysis. Compare Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ffi|13-14; 
with McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at [^19; Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982. But many courts 
across the country have similarly "held or assumed, . . . with little or no discussion, that 
the statute limits the total period of probation" to the time specified. Albano, 698 F.2d at 
146 (citations omitted). And few, if any, of those statutes have later been reinterpreted to 
"provide[] no statutory limitation on the length of probation a trial court may impose." 
Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at }\ 14; see Albano, 698 F.2d at 146. 
The trial court sentenced Candedo to a 108-month probationary term. R. 246; 
270:35. As was appropriate under the statutory interpretation of the time, Candedo 
questioned the trial court's "power" to impose such a lengthy probationary term. R. 
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270:35, Bi it lie did not argue—and ii ideed 1 lad i 10 reasoi 1 to argue tl lat tl le stati ite itsell 
violalcd substantive due process because, as interpreted by settled case law, it did not. 
See McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at 1119; Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982. 
Thus, this Court si 101 ild reverse tl le court of appeals' conclusioi I tl lal tl le 
ex< /• • ' ' • .!i * :- « auow it to "address Candedo's substantive 
due process argument." Candedo, 2008 UT App 4 at \\ ("• li --hi -ukl then reach the merits 
of Candedo's substantive due process argument. 
CONC1 ;USI()N 
Candedo respectfully asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing 
because his sei itei ice to set ve a i ni ie- yeai pi: obatioi lai: y pei iod violates di le process. 
Candedo asks this Court to reach the merits of his argument through either rule 22(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or the exceptional circumstances doctrine. 
SI IBM I I .1 ED this ^ > day of August, 2008. 
LORIJTSEPPI 
Attorncv forD»-*. •: . . . :":oner 
39 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered an original and 
nine copies of the foregoing to the Utah Supreme Court, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells 
Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
0854, this ffi day of August, 2008. 
Aft^ : LORI 
DELIVERED this t ^ day of August, 2008. 
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McHUGH, Judge: 
[^l Francisco A. Candedo appeals his conviction for one count 
each of Securities Fraud, a second degree felony, see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 61-1-1, -21 (2006) , and Sales by an Unlicensed Agent and 
Employing an Unlicensed Agent, both third degree felonies, see 
id. §§ 61-1- 3, -21 (2006) .3 Candedo argues that this court 
should reverse because either (1) the trial court may not impose 
consecutive terms of probation under the Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure, see Utah Code Ann, § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (Supp. 2 0 07), 
or (2) section 77-18-] (] 0) (a) (:i ), as interpreted, by State v. 
1. Candedo was charged under the current version of the statute. 
The Utah Legislature last amended the applicable sections in 
19 83, see Utah Uniform Securities Act Amendment, ch. 2 84, sec. 4, 
§ 61-1-1, 1983 Utah Laws 1108, 1114 (codified as amended at Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2006)); 1997, see Uniform Securities Act 
Amendments, ch. 160, sec. 1, § 61-1-3, 1997 Utah Laws 522, 522-23 
(codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (2006)); and 
2001, see Penalty for Misuse of Securities, ch. 14 9, sec. 1, 
§ 61-1-21, 2001 Utah Laws 753, 753 (codi fied as amended at Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (2006)). 
Wallace, 2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d 540, violates substantive due 
process under the Utah and U.S. constitutions. We affirm. 
f2 First, Candedo asserts that the trial court exceeded its 
statutory authority by sentencing him to 108 months of probation. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). A trial court's 
sentencing decision, including whether to grant or deny 
probation, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
See State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, % 14, 82 P.3d 1167. 
"An abuse of discretion results when the judge fails to consider 
all legally relevant factors or if the 'sentence imposed is 
clearly excessive." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
sentencing statute at issue here states that "[p]robation may be 
terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 3 6 months probation in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases."2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) . 
After reviewing section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) in Wallace, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "our law currently provides no statutory 
limitation on the length of probation a trial court may impose." 
2006 UT 86, K 14 (emphasis added). 
^3 Candedo argues that the Utah statute does not give a trial 
court the authority to impose consecutive terms of probation, an 
issue raised but not addressed in Wallace. See id. ^ 4. 
However, this characterization of Candedofs sentence does not 
accurately reflect the trial court's probation order. In the 
sentencing order, the Order of Probation section specifies that 
"[t]he defendant is placed on probation for 108 month(s)"; 
nowhere does that section use the term "consecutive."3 See State 
v. Penney, 776 P.2d 91, 92-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Where the 
language of a judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be given 
effect as it is written. . . . Although, the judge may have 
intended the terms to run consecutively, we do not examine his 
2. In 1989, section 77-18-1 was amended--notably, "shall" became 
"may"--as discussed in State v. Wallace. See 2006 UT 86, ^ 10-
11, 150 P.3d 540; see also Probation Amendments, ch. 226, sec. 1, 
§ 77-18-1(7)(a), 1989 Utah Laws 689, 690 (codified as amended at 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (Supp. 2007)) . Candedo was 
sentenced under the current version of the statute. 
3. Although the Probation Conditions section states that 
"Defendant is sentenced to 36 months on each count," only the 
Sentence Prison Concurrent/Consecutive Note section uses the term 
"consecutive"; this note section also states that Defendant's 
"[p]rison terms are concurrent with each other." In contrast, 
the Order of Probation states merely that Candedo "is placed on 
probation for 108 month(s)." 
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intent where the written order is unequivocal." (internal 
quotation marks and alteration omitted)) 
%4 Even assuming that the juxtaposition of the Order of 
Probation section and Probation Conditions section rendered this 
order equivocal, Wallace indicates that imposing thirty-six 
months for each count would nevertheless be within the trial 
court's authority: 
We granted certiorari on two issues: whether 
section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) creates a thirty-
six-month limitation for a term of probation 
as to any felony conviction; and whether 
terms of probation for multiple convictions 
may be imposed consecutively. Because we 
conclude that the Legislature has not limited 
terms of probation to any particular time 
period, we need not and do not reach the 
second issue. 
2006 UT 86, f 4 (emphasis added). Wallace holds that there is 
"no statutory time limitation on probation." Id. ^ 16. Because 
a trial court is not time limited in its authority to impose 
probation, see id. *h 14, the 108-month sentence is not "clearly 
excessive." See Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, % 14. 
Consequently, as in Wallace, we need not consider whether-
assuming such a limitation did exist--the trial court could 
circumvent that limit by ordering consecutive probation periods 
where multiple crimes were committed. We hold that the trial 
court did not exceed its discretion in sentencing Candedo to 108 
months of probation. 
%5 Second, Candedo argues that the probation statute, as 
interpreted by Wallace, violates his due process rights under the 
Utah and U.S. constitutions. Candedo concedes that he did not 
properly preserve his due process argument in the trial court. 
However, he asserts that he can still appeal this issue under 
rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or, 
alternatively, under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. We 
disagree with both of these contentions. 
%6 Under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, an 
appellate court "may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(e), However, rule 22(e) only applies to a "'patently'" or 
"'manifestly' illegal sentence," State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 
9, K 15, 84 P.3d 854 (quoting State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 
(Utah 1990); State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, % 5, 48 P.3d 228), 
which the Utah Supreme Court has defined as occurring where 
either "the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or . . the 
20050899-CA 3 
sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range.'1 Id. (citing 
Telford, 2002 UT 51, K 5 n.l). Here, there is no dispute that 
the trial court had jurisdiction. Furthermore, in light of the 
supreme court's statutory interpretation of section 77-18-
1(10)(a)(i) and its holding that a "twelve-year probation does 
not constitute an illegal sentence," State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 
86, f 16, 150 P.3d 540, Candedo's nine-year probation is not an 
illegal sentence. Therefore, Candedo's claim that his sentence 
violates his due process rights is not reviewable under rule 
22 (e) . 
%1 Alternatively, Candedo argues that this court can review his 
constitutional claim, despite his failure to raise it in the 
trial court, under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. "The 
exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device,' to 
assure that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure 
to consider an issue on appeal.'" State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 
923 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)); see also State v. NeIson-Waggoner, 
2004 UT 29, f 23, 94 P.3d 186 ("[The exceptional circumstances 
doctrine is] reserv[ed] . . . for the most unusual circumstances 
where our failure to consider an issue that was not properly 
preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest 
injustice."). It is "used sparingly, properly reserved for truly 
exceptional situations, for cases . . . involving 'rare 
procedural anomalies.'" Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (quoting State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 12.09 n.3 (Utah 1993)); see, e.g., In re 
T.M., 2003 UT App 191, fl 16, 73 P. 3d 959 (determining that an 
"amendment [to the termination statute] was 'a change in law or 
the settled interpretation of law'" and therefore "the 
exceptional circumstances exception applie[d]" (emphasis added)). 
Candedo argues that, because the Utah Supreme Court had not yet 
held that trial courts could impose unlimited probationary 
terms,4 he "'had no particular need to' argue the probation 
statute violated substantive due process." (Quoting Irwin, 924 
P.2d at 10.) He bases this argument on the inference from 
decisions of the court of appeals, prior to Wallace, that there 
were statutory limitations on probation. See State v. McDonald, 
2005 UT App 86, 1 21, 110 P.3d 149 ("The probationary term for a 
class C misdemeanor may not exceed twelve months pursuant to Utah 
Code section 77-18-1 (10) (a) ( [i])." (emphasis omitted)), cert. 
4. The Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court had not 
issued their respective opinions in State v. Wallace until after 
the trial court entered its order sentencing Candedo to 108 
months of probation. See Wallace, 2 0 06 UT 8 6 (issued Dec. 19, 
2006), aff'g 2005 UT App 434, 124 P.3d 259 (issued Oct. 14, 
2 005). The sentencing order at issue in this appeal is dated 
September 12, 2005. 
20050899-CA 4 
denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 
979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (" [T] he maximum formal probation 
periods for . . . a class B misdemeanor [] and . . . a class A 
misdemeanor [] are respectively twelve months and thirty-six. 
months . . . . " (citation omitted) ) . But see State v. Wallace, 
2005 UT App 434, f 18 n.10, 124 P.3d 259 ("We are not bound by 
cases which, in dicta,, assume without deciding that Utah Code 
section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) creates maximum probationary 
periods."), afffd, 2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d 540. However, we do not 
find this argument sufficiently compelling to satisfy the 
doctrine of exceptional circumstances. 
%8 First, we fail to see how the supreme court's decision in 
Wallace--by clarifying section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) in a way that is 
detrimental to Candedo1s 22(e) claim--supports the argument that 
Candedo failed to raise his constitutional claim at trial because 
of the previous decisions of this court. Although Candedo might 
have believed that the trial court imposed an illegal 
probationary term by exceeding the statutory limits allegedly 
approved in McDonald and Robinson, we do not see how the 
confidence in that claim interfered with his ability to evalu^. « 
his due process argument. See McDonald, 2 0 05 UT App 86, % 21: 
Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982. Candedo was always free to assert 
both arguments in the trial court.5 Moreover, the fact that ' 
trial court imposed such a long period of probation--after 
disagreeing with Candedo' s assertion that it did not have the 
authority to do so--should have put Candedo on notice that his 
due process rights were arguably implicated.6 
5. Additionally, Candedo's reliance on State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2d 
1127 (Utah 1994), is misplaced. In that case, the defendant's 
argument under the exceptional circumstances doctrine succeeded 
because the trial court initially ruled in his favor and, at that 
time, "the pretext doctrine was the controlling rule of Fourth 
Amendment law as interpreted by the court of appeals." Id. at 
1130, 1134 & n.2. The court also noted that "[the d] ef endant had 
no reason to argue that the doctrine be adopted under [the Utah 
Constitution] until the State challenged the doctrine on appeal." 
Id. at 1134 n.2, 
6. We reiterate, however, this court's comment in State v. 
Wallace, 2 0 05 UT App 4 34, affTd, 2 006 UT 86: "Defendant here did 
not have to accept the terms of his probation. . . . [He] did 
not choose incarceration. He chose probation and thereby 
accepted its terms. Having accepted its terms, he now must abide 
by them." Id. U 19 (citing State v. Allmendinger, 565 P. 2d 1119, 
1121 (Utah 1 97^0 ) 
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^9 Furthermore, the constitutional limitations of probation 
terms were not addressed in Wallace or either of the two cases 
Candedo cites in support of his exceptional circumstances 
argument. Even if Candedo reasonably believed that he could 
later appeal the sentence under rule 22(e), he could have 
asserted his due process claim as well. We will not expand the 
exceptional circumstances exception to include Candedo's 
situation as it does not rise to the level of a "rare procedural 
anomal[y]." See Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1209 n.3); cf. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) 
(refusing to address the defendant's due process claim on the 
ground that he failed to preserve it and rejecting his argument 
that exceptional circumstances existed where State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), decided after his trial, allegedly 
would have supported his due process claim); see also State v. 
Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (refusing to address the 
merits of the defendant's due process claim, which was based on 
Ramirez's new constitutional requirements, because it was not 
raised at trial--even though Ramirez issued after the defendant's 
trial). See generally Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778, 780-81 (holding 
that determination of "the due process reliability of eyewitness 
identifications . . . . will require an in-depth appraisal of the 
identification's reliability").7 We therefore hold that Candedo 
did not preserve his due process argument and we do not address 
it on appeal. 
^10 The trial court did not exceed its discretion when it 
sentenced Candedo to 108 months of probation. We do not address 
Candedo's substantive due process argument because he failed to 
preserve it and neither rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
7. Candedo further asserts that we should review his due process 
claim despite his failure to preserve it because "the issue 
involves a question of law that can be easily reviewed for the 
first time on appeal; judicial efficiency would be furthered by 
reaching the issue now . . . / and justice would be served." 
However, he cites no authority for these assertions, and we 
therefore do not address them. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 
2002 UT 43, 1| 23 n.9, 48 P.3d 918 ("We decline to address [the 
defendant's] claim because it has not been properly 
briefed. . . . A single, vague sentence without citation to the 
record or legal authority is inadequate." (citing State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988))). 
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Procedure nor the exceptional circumstances doctrine applies 
under the facts of this case. 
Ull Affirmed. 
fl2 WE CONCUR: 
amela T. Greenwood, ^ 
Presiding Judge 
Gregorv>*K. (Jrme , Judge 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
— - o o O o o — - UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
S t a t e of Utah , JUL 1 | pfjjfg 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. Case No. 20080183-SC 
Francisco A. Candedo, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on March 3, 2008. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issues. 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner's due 
process arguments could not be raised under rule 22 (e) of the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding exceptional 
circumstances did not justify treatment of Petitioner's due 
process arguments on the merits. 
3. Whether the imposition of a nine-year probationary term 
violated Petitioner's right to due process. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
Dated ~~1 ~l\~ °^ 
For The Court 
Matthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
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U. S. Constitution Amendment XIV 
Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868. 
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of 
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against 
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such 
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section VII 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2005) 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probat ion — Supervision —• Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension — Hearings — 
Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyarjce, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend 
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The 
court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court, 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
"standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for sendees; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided, 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
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or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any 
treatment program in which the defendant is currently participating, 
if the program is acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
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(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect atid disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt 
of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
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(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court tha t authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arres t or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a t ime and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant a t least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for t rea tment at the Utah 
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State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
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(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 
3380, ch. 15, & 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2: 1982, ch. 
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; 
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch. 
212, § 37; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2; 
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch. 
14, § 3; 1993, ch- 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3; 
1994, ch. 13, § 24: 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994, 
ch. 230, § 1: 1995, ch. 20, § 146; 1995, ch. 
117, § 2; 1995, ch. 184, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 3; 
1995, ch. 337, § 11; 1995, ch. 352, § 6; 1996, 
ch, 79, § 103; 1997, ch. 392, § 2; 1998, ch. 94, 
§ 10; 1999, ch. 279, § 8; 1999, ch. 287, § 7; 
2001, ch. 137, § l;2002,ch.35,§ 7; 2002 (5th 
S.S.), ch. 8, § 137; 2003, ch. 290, § 3; 2005 
(1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2005 (1st S.S.) 
amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added "in-
cluding any treatment program in which the 
defendant is currently participating, if the pro-
gram is acceptable to the court" in Subsection 
(8)(a)(iv). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1 (2003) 
77-27-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(2) "Commission" means the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile 
Justice. 
(3) "Commutation" is the change from a greater to a lesser punishment 
after conviction. 
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(5) "Expiration" occurs when the maximum sentence has run. 
(6) "Family" means persons related to the victim as a spouse, child, 
sibling, parent, or grandparent, or the victim's legal guardian. 
(7) "Panel" means members of the board assigned by the chairperson to 
a particular case. 
(8) "Pardon" is an act of grace by an appropriate authority exempting a 
person from punishment for a crime. 
(9) "Parole" is a release from imprisonment on prescribed conditions 
which, if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, enables the parolee to 
obtain a termination of his sentence. 
(10) "Probation" is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposi-
tion or execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed 
conditions. 
(11) "Reprieve or respite" is the temporary suspension of the execution 
of the sentence. 
(12) "Termination" is the act of an appropriate authority discharging 
from parole or concluding the sentence of imprisonment prior to the 
expiration of the sentence. 
(13) "Victim" means: 
(a) a person against whom the defendant committed a felony or 
class A misdemeanor offense, and regarding which offense a hearing is 
held under this chapter; or 
(b) the victim's family, if the victim is deceased as a result of the 
offense for which a hearing is held under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-1, enacted by L. prieves, Utah Const., Art. VII, § 12. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 198, § 6; 1988, ch. Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Jus-
172, § 1; 1990, ch. 195, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 31; tice, § 63-25a-101 et seq. 
1996, ch. 100, § 3. Termination or discharge of parolee from 
Cross-References. — Board of Pardons,
 s ex itence, § 76-3-202. 
governor's power to grant respites and re-
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 3, 1971 
Audio 
Tape Number: 22 Tape Count: 1100 
CHARGES 
SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty 
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty 
3rd Degree Felony 
05/31/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: 22 COUNT: 1100 
On record the defense objections to recommendations is heard. 
COUNT: 1123 
Victims testifies. 
COUNT: 1146 
Defense witnesses are heard. 
COUNT: 1154 
Sentencing. 
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Case No: 031900400 
Date: Sep 12, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison terms are concurrent with each other. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
No credit for good time. 
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Case No: 031900400 
Date: Sep 12, 2005 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge # 2 
Charge # 3 
Total Fine: 
Total Suspended: 
Total Surcharge: 
Total Principal Due: 
$10000.00 
$10000.00 
$0 
$0 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 108 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole, 
Defendant to serve 3 65 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Defendant is sentenced to 36 months on each count. 
Defendant is to pay full restitution jointly and serverally. An 
amount if agreed upon is to be filed with the court within 180 days 
or a hearing will be set. 
Defendant to pay a fine and surcharge of $10,000 which is 
suspended. 
Defendant is to serve 3 65 days jail with no credit for good time. 
Defendant is to surrender passport. ^^tr^r^^ ^ 
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sorry about that or not. I just decided to stay, and here we are 
now. 
THE COURT: 
were working? 
MR. CANDEDO: 
didn't. 
MR. BUGDEN: 
MR. CANDEDO 
MR. BUGDEN: 
MR. CANDEDO 
THE COURT: 
MR. CANDEDO 
Did you get a paycheck the whole time you 
No, actually the last four months I 
Were you ever paid a commission or bonuses? 
No, I was not. 
You were just salary? 
: I was salary. 
What was your salary? 
: It ended being 6500 a month, which is 
about — a little bit more than I was making in Mexico before I 
moved here. In Mexico I was making $5,000 a month. I was a 
sales manager for a company (inaudible) over there. 
MR. BUGDEN: I think that's what we have to say. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I have reviewed a great 
deal of information on this, and I do not believe that Mr. 
Candedo had the same level of responsibility as Ms. Cano, 
although he has responsibility. 
What I think is the most fair thing to do with him is to 
have him serve some time, and then to work for a long time paying 
as much money back as humanly possible. 
I'm going to sentence him to one to five on the 
securities fraud -- one to fifteen, excuse me, and zero to five 
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1 I on the sales by an unlicensed broker and employing an unlicensed 
2 broker — concurrent sentences, 
3 I'm going to suspend — I'm also going to fine him 
4 $10,000 plus surcharge. I'm going to suspend the prison and the 
5 I fine. I'm going to order him to serve 365 days in Salt Lake 
County jail and no credit for good time, no -- he could be 
eligible for work release or ankle monitor, depending on the 
jail's standards for that. 
9 1 He is ordered to pay full restitution jointly and 
10 severally. I'm going to give the State 180 days to reach an 
11 J agreement on the amount of restitution or to request a hearing 
12 where we will determine the amount of restitution. 
13 Surrender the passports. All the normal conditions of 
14 probation, which will be for 108 months. That's 36 months on 
15 each of the counts. That's nine years because of the amount of 
16 money that you've got to pay back. 
17 No contact with Ms. Cano or any other defendant in this 
18 case. Any questions? 
19 MR. BUGDEN: Your Honor, may I just politely inquire, do 
2 0 you have a power to --
21 THE COURT: I can give 36 months on each of three 
22 felonies that he's convicted of. 
23 MR. BUGDEN: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
2 5 (Hearing concluded) 
TabF 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge. 
*1 Thomas Headley appeals the district court's 
denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence 
submitted under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. He contends the district court 
erred in ruling that his motion did "not attack the 
legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in 
which the sentence was imposed."Headley's conten-
tion is two-fold: (1) his counsel at sentencing 
provided ineffective assistance; and (2) the senten-
cing court relied on information in the presentence 
report that the court knew was false. We affirm. 
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a legal 
question that we review for correctness, see State v. 
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v. 
Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 384-85 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997), and we can affirm the decision "if it 
is sustainable on any legal ground or theory appar-
ent on the rzcor&." State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 
IT 31, 994 P.2d 1243. Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure provides for resentencing 
when a sentence is illegal or "imposed in an illegal 
manner." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e). The definition of 
an "illegal sentence" has been construed narrowly 
to include only sentences "where the sentence does 
not conform to the crime of which the defendant 
has been convicted."FN1£tate v. Parker, 872 P.2d 
1041, 1043 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Utah law has 
no comprehensive definition of sentences "imposed 
in an illegal manner"; however, the Utah Supreme 
Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed in an il-
legal manner when a defendant is deprived of his or 
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel during sen-
tencing.™2^ Kuehnert v.. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 
150, 499 P.2d 839, 841 (1975) (concluding that the 
sentence was illegal because the defendant did not 
have counsel at sentencing, was not informed of his 
Sixth Amendment rights during sentencing, and had 
not knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth 
Amendment rights).™3 In Kuehnert, the Utah Su-
preme Court stated that the presence of counsel at 
sentencing is necessary 
FN1. Nonconforming sentences include 
those where the sentence exceeds the stat-
utory limits. See, e.g., State v. Higgin-
botham, 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996) 
(concluding that the sentence was illegal 
because statute only authorized one year 
enhancement and the court enhanced sen-
tence by two years); State v. Patience, 944 
P.2d 381, 388 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (noting 
that the sentence was illegal because it ex-
ceeded statutory term). Nonconforming 
sentences also occur when the court is 
without jurisdiction to impose a sentence. 
See, e.g., State v. Hurst, 111 P.2d 1029, 
1036 n. 6 (Utah 1989) (stating that sen-
tences can be attacked when beyond the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court); State 
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v. Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, ffif 5-8, 993 
P.2d 894 (stating that the sentence was il-
legal because Supremacy Clause deprived 
sentencing court of jurisdiction); State v. 
Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (stating that the sentence 
was illegal because court did not have jur-
isdiction to revoke probation). 
FN2. Other jurisdictions have defined sen-
tences imposed in an illegal manner as 
those that are within statutory and jurisdic-
tional limits, but violate a defendant's 
rights, see, e.g., Government of the V.I. v. 
Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 299 n. 3 (3rd 
Cir.2001); State v. McNeills, 546 A.2d 
292, 305-06 (Conn.Ct.App.1988); State v. 
Sieler, 554 N.W.2d 447, 479 (S.D.1996); 
cf. State v. Anderson, 661 P.2d 716, 720-24 
(Haw.Ct.App.1983); State v. Brooks, 589 
A.2d 444, 447 (Maine 1991); or that are 
based on erroneous information. See, e.g., 
United States v. Katzin, 824 F .2d 234, 238 
(3rd Cir. 1987). 
FN3.Kuehnert, which discusses illegal sen-
tences under the rules in force prior to 
Rule 22(e), was not cited in the parties' briefs. 
so that there is a real opportunity to present to the 
court facts in extenuation of the offense or in ex-
planation of the defendant's conduct, as well as to 
correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the de-
fendant's past record and to appeal to the equity of 
the court in its administration and enforcement of 
penal laws. 
M a t 840-4 l.FN4 
FN4.&e also McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 
2, 4, 89 S.Ct. 32, 33-34 (1968) ("As we 
said in Mempa [v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 
135, 88 S.Ct. 254, 257 (1967) ], 'the neces-
sity for the aid of counsel in marshaling 
the facts, introducing evidence of mitigat-
ing circumstances[,] and in general aiding 
and assisting the defendant to present his 
case as to sentence is apparent.'The right 
to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, be 
treated like the right to counsel at other 
stages of adjudication."(Citation omit- ted.)). 
Headley first claims his counsel at sentencing 
provided ineffective assistance, thus depriving him 
of his Sixth Amendment right. To support his 
claim, Headley makes six assertions, four are as 
follows: (1) he asserts that his challenge to misin-
formation in the presentence investigation report 
was rejected by the sentencing court because it was 
poorly handled by sentencing counsel; (2) he chal-
lenges several factual statements contained in the 
presentence investigation report; (3) he asserts that 
"his own counsel accused him of being involved in 
incest when that information was not otherwise be-
fore the court"; and (4) he asserts that "his 
[sentencing] counsel convinced a witness with po-
tentially exculpatory evidence not to cooperate with 
[Headley]." Each of these four assertions has some 
connection with the presentence investigation re-
port, which is not in the record on appeal. Further, 
no other information in the record supports these 
assertions. Accordingly, as discussed below, we are 
unable to address them. 
*2 Next, Headley claims the sentencing court im-
posed a $10,000 fine without reason and without 
objection by his counsel. We find no mention of a 
$10,000 fine in the record. The only fines men-
tioned in the sentencing context, a $1,000 recoup-
ment fee and an unspecified amount to "pay for 
costs of extradition and for therapy of victim," are 
found in the sentencing transcript and the Judgment 
filed three days later. Finally, Headley alleges that 
"his counsel intentionally tried to prevent him from 
pursuing an appeal."However, the record reflects 
that Headley filed a notice of appeal on September 
24, 1992, but voluntarily moved to dismiss his ap-
peal to "file a motion to withdraw his plea of 
guilty."Headley's motion was granted on October 8, 
1992, and the record contains no indication of sub-
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sequent attempts to appeal the case. 
Without the presentence report or other information 
which may or may not be in the sentencing court 
record, the record submitted to us is inadequate for 
our review of Headley's ineffective assistance 
claim. All we have are Headley's unilateral, bald as-
sertions of misconduct. As we have stated, 
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate 
court], he has the duty and responsibility of sup-
porting such allegation by an adequate record. Ab-
sent that record, a defendant's assignment of error 
stands as a unilateral allegation which the review-
ing court has no power to determine. [An appellate 
court] simply cannot rule on a question which de-
pends for its existence upon alleged facts unsuppor-
ted by the record. Consequently, in the face of an 
[in] adequate record on appeal, [we] must assume 
the regularity of the proceedings below. 
State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (1998) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted) 
(alterations in original); see also State v. Lither-
land, 2000 UT 76, \ 17, 12 P.3d 92 ("Where the re-
cord appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities 
or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be 
construed in favor of a finding that counsel per-
formed effectively."). Accordingly, we reject Head-
ley's Sixth Amendment claim. 
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court was 
biased because it relied on information in the 
presentence report that the court knew was false. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (Supp.2001) gives a 
sentencing judge discretion in evaluating informa-
tion in a presentence report and requires the judge 
to "make a determination of relevance and accuracy 
on the record."Here, the sentencing judge made a 
determination of the relevance and accuracy of the 
presentence report, deciding the presentence report 
was "comprehensive in all the details," and stating 
that those working on elements of the presentence 
report "do a pretty good job." The sentencing court 
has broad discretion to resolve factual disputes for 
or against a defendant, see id., and we cannot say 
the court exceeded its discretion in making this de-
termination. Further, without the presentence re-
port, the record is inadequate and " '[we] must as-
sume the regularity of the proceedings 
below.' " Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162 (citation omit-
ted) (alteration in original). 
*3 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial 
of Headley's Rule 22(e) motion for resentencing. 
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., J., con-
cur.GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the res-
ult). 
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but 
would affirm on what I perceive to be a more 
straightforward basis. As stated by the majority, the 
trial court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion be-
cause the motion did "not attack the legality of the 
sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sen-
tence was imposed.'The trial court was correct. 
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and erroneous fact findings by the senten-
cing judge are simply not cognizable under Rule 
22(e). Defendant has not cited any caselaw holding 
otherwise and has also not offered any reasoned 
analysis for why Rule 22(e) should apply to his 
case. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 
1998) (briefs must include "reasoned analysis based 
on [cited] authority"). The sentence imposed was 
permissible under applicable statutes, and the trial 
court properly resolved factual disputes presented 
to it. Defendant raises no claims legitimately re-
lated to whether the sentence was illegal or 
"imposed in an illegal manner." Utah R.Crim. P. 
22(e). On that basis, I would affirm. 
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